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CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO REGULATE
NONCOMMERCIAL ACTIVITY OVERSEAS:
INTERSTATE COMMERCE CLAUSE PRECEDENT
INDICATES CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON
FOREIGN COMMERCE CLAUSE AUTHORITY
Jeff Christensen
Abstract: Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not yet ruled any statutes criminalizing
the conduct of Americans overseas unconstitutional under the Foreign Commerce Clause,
three U.S. Courts of Appeals decisions use the concept of enumerated powers-important in
U.S. Supreme Court decisions that invalidate statutes grounded in the Interstate Commerce
Clause-to suggest limitations on Congress's Foreign Commerce Clause power. In two
decisions, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Ninth Circuits employed the U.S.
Supreme Court's Interstate Commerce Clause framework when analyzing statutes under the
Foreign Commerce Clause. In so doing, these courts suggest that Foreign Commerce Clause
power is not plenary-the constitutional concerns driving the U.S. Supreme Court to
recognize limitations on Congress's Interstate Commerce Clause power also impose
limitations on Congress's Foreign Commerce Clause power. In the third decision, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals suggested a similar limitation, holding that Congress could enact a
statute under its Foreign Commerce Clause power only if the statute demonstrated a
constitutionally tenable nexus with foreign commerce by including an economic component.
Section 2423(0(1) of the PROTECT Act, which criminalizes noncommercial sexual abuse of
minors overseas, fails to withstand Foreign Commerce Clause scrutiny under current U.S.
Courts of Appeals analyses because the statute regulates criminal conduct occurring outside
the channels of foreign commerce and does not include an economic component.
In United States v. Clark,' the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held that 18 U.S.C. § 2423(f)(2),2 a provision of the Prosecutorial
Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today
Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act),3 did not exceed Congress's enumerated
authority "to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.",4 In rejecting the
defendant's Foreign Commerce Clause challenge against § 2423(c), the
Ninth Circuit deliberately limited its holding to § 2423(f)(2) 5-which
prohibits U.S. citizens and permanent residents from engaging in
1. 435 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 2006).
2. Although subsections (c) and (f) of 18 U.S.C. § 2423 operate together, for clarity this
Comment will reference only the applicable component of subsection (f) in place of both
subsections whenever possible.
3. Pub. L. 102-21, 117 Stat. 652.
4. 435 F.3d 1100, 1102 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
5. See id. at 1117.
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commercial sex acts with minors overseas.6 The court did not address a
different part of the PROTECT Act, namely 18 U.S.C. § 2423(f)(1), 7
which criminalizes noncommercial sexual abuse of minors overseas. 8
This Comment addresses Congress's constitutional authority under
the Foreign Commerce Clause to enact § 2423(f)(1) of the PROTECT
Act. It argues that, at least under the analyses currently employed by the
U.S. Courts of Appeals, 9 the criminalization of noncommercial sexual
abuse of minors overseas falls outside the legitimate scope of Congress's
Foreign Commerce Clause authority. The current Foreign Commerce
Clause analyses in the U.S. Courts of Appeals draw heavily on the U.S.
Supreme Court's Interstate Commerce Clause analysis.1l Accordingly,
Congress's power to enact legislation under the Foreign Commerce
Clause appears limited to laws that would either satisfy the Interstate
Commerce Clause framework or demonstrate a tenable nexus with
foreign commerce by including an economic component. Section
2423(f)(1) does not withstand Foreign Commerce Clause scrutiny under
current U.S. Courts of Appeals analyses because the provision fails to
demonstrate either of these required connections to commerce.
Part I of this Comment describes § 2423(0(1) of the PROTECT Act.
Part II discusses the limits of congressional authority under the Interstate
Commerce Clause. Part III describes two U.S. Courts of Appeals
decisions that evaluate Foreign Commerce Clause challenges by
employing the U.S. Supreme Court's Interstate Commerce Clause
analysis. Part IV examines a slightly different analysis, applied by the
Ninth Circuit in Clark, which requires that the text of the challenged
6. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2423(c) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006) ("Engaging in illicit sexual conduct in
foreign places.-Any United States citizen or alien admitted for permanent residence who travels in
foreign commerce, and engages in any illicit sexual conduct with another person shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both."); § 2423(0 ("Definition.-As used
in this section, the term 'illicit sexual conduct' means ... (2) any commercial sex act (as defined in
section 1591) with a person under 18 years of age.").
7. See Clark, 435 F.3dat 1105.
8. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2423(c); id. § 2423(0 ("Definition.-As used in this section, the term 'illicit
sexual conduct' means (1) a sexual act (as defined in section 2246) with a person under 18 years of
age that would be in violation of chapter 109A if the sexual act occurred in the special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction of the United States .... ). Chapter 109A criminalizes various forms of
noncommercial sexual abuse. See id. § 2241 (aggravated sexual abuse); id. § 2242 (sexual abuse);
id. § 2243 (sexual abuse of a minor or ward).
9. See Clark, 435 F.3d at 1109-17; United States v. Bredimus, 352 F.3d 200, 204-08 (5th Cir.
2003); United States v. Cummings, 281 F.3d 1046, 1048-51 (9th Cir. 2002).
10. See Clark, 435 F.3d at 1109-17; Bredimus, 352 F.3d at 204-08; Cummings, 281 F.3d at
1048-51.
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statute demonstrate a constitutionally tenable nexus with foreign
commerce. Applying those analyses to § 2423(f)(1), Part V argues that
Congress's criminalization of noncommercial sexual abuse of minors
overseas cannot be justified solely on the basis of Congress's Foreign
Commerce Clause authority.
1. THE PROTECT ACT CRIMINALIZES NONCOMMERCIAL
SEXUAL ABUSE OF MINORS OVERSEAS
Section 2423(f)(1) of the PROTECT Act criminalizes conduct
occurring outside U.S. territory regardless of whether that conduct is
commercial in nature."l Section 2423(c) provides that "[a]ny United
States citizen or alien admitted for permanent residence who travels in
foreign commerce, and engages in any illicit sexual conduct with
another person shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
30 years, or both."1 2 Section 2423(f)(2), in turn, defines the phrase
"illicit sexual conduct" as "any commercial sex act . . . with a person
under 18 years of age."' 3 Section 2423(f)(1) defines the same phrase as
any "sexual act,"' 4 whether commercial or not, that would violate
chapter 109A [18 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2243], 15 which criminalizes various
forms of sexual abuse.' 6 Notably, none of the prohibitions in chapter
109A require that the abuse take place in a commercial context.'
7
Accordingly, § 2423(c) and (f)(1) criminalizes the sexual abuse of
minors overseas regardless of whether that abuse takes place in a
commercial context.
Although Congress did not restrict its criminalization of overseas
sexual abuse to only that occurring in commercial contexts, 8 it
nonetheless appears that Congress rooted its authority to enact the
PROTECT Act in its power under the Foreign Commerce Clause. 19 The
11. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2423(c), (f); Clark, 435 F.3d at 1105.
12. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2423(c).
13. Id. § 2423(0 (emphasis added). "[C]ommercial sex act" is defined as "any sex act, on account
of which anything of value is given to or received by any person." 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c) (2000).
14. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2423(f) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006).
15. See id.
16. See supra note 8.
17. See United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1105 (9th Cir. 2006).
18. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2423(c), (0.
19. See Clark, 435 F.3d at 1114 (noting "the phrase 'travels in foreign commerce' unequivocally
establishes that Congress specifically invoked the Foreign Commerce Clause").
Washington Law Review
PROTECT Act itself contains no explicit statement of lawmaking
authority, but the statutory language in § 2423(c) was first proposed as a
provision in the Sex Tourism Prohibition Improvement Act of 2002
(STPI Act).2 ' The House of Representatives Report accompanying the
STPI Act included a "Constitutional Authority Statement" expressly
identifying the Commerce Clause as Congress's constitutional authority
for enacting the STPI Act.21 Although the STPI Act died in committee,22
its relevant language was incorporated verbatim into the PROTECT Act
under § 2423.23 Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that Congress intended
to rely on its Foreign Commerce Clause power when it enacted
§ 2423(c). 24
II. CONGRESS'S CONSTITUTIONALLY ENUMERATED
AUTHORITY TO REGULATE COMMERCE IS LIMITED
The U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged that Congress's power
under the Commerce Clause is broad,25 and that Congress's Foreign
Commerce Clause power is greater than its Interstate Commerce Clause
power.26 However, the Court has often reiterated the axiom that our
federal government is one of enumerated powers.27 As such, there are
limitations on how far Congress's Commerce Clause authority extends.28
These limitations are illustrated in the Court's seminal decisions on
Congress's Interstate Commerce Clause power-United States v.
Lopez29 and United States v. Morrison.
30
20. See id. at 1104 (discussing PROTECT Act's legislative origins).
21. See H.R. REP. No. 107-525, at 5 (2002); see also Clark, 435 F.3d at 1104 (discussing
PROTECT Act's legislative origins).
22. See Clark, 435 F.3d at 1104 (discussing PROTECT Act's legislative origins).
23. Compare H.R. REP. No. 107-525, at 2, with 18 U.S.C.A. § 2423(c).
24. See Clark, 435 F.3d at 1104.
25. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608 (2000).
26. See Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979).
27. See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607 ("Every law enacted by Congress must be based on one
or more of its powers enumerated in the Constitution."); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552
(1995) ("The Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers.").
28. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557). Although the U.S. Supreme
Court has found Congress's Commerce Clause power over Indian tribes to be plenary, see, for
example, United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004), no court has applied federal Indian law
jurisprudence when analyzing Congress's authority under the Foreign Commerce Clause.
29. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
30. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). This Comment does not address the U.S. Supreme Court's recent
Interstate Commerce Clause decision, Gonzales v. Raich. 545 U.S. 1, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). In
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A. The U.S. Supreme Court Has Only Declared That Congress's
Foreign Commerce Clause Power is Broader Than Its Interstate
Commerce Clause Power
The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress broad
power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes. 31 Indeed, the U.S. Supreme
Court has never invalidated a statute because Congress exceeded its
authority to regulate foreign commerce in its enactment.3 2 Thus, it is
difficult to say with any certainty how the Court would analyze a federal
statute so challenged under the Foreign Commerce Clause.33 The Court's
clearest statement in cases involving the Foreign Commerce Clause is
that Congress's powers under the Foreign Commerce Clause are broader
than those it possesses under the Interstate Commerce Clause.34 The
Court has never articulated a more specific connection between the two
clauses.35
Raich, the Court held that Congress's Interstate Commerce Clause authority includes the power to
prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana in compliance with state law. See id. at 2198-99,
2201. Although Clark-the only U.S. Court of Appeals decision employing a Foreign Commerce
Clause analysis after Raich-acknowledged that Raich took a "took a more generous view of
Congress's power over interstate commerce than seen in Lopez and Morrison," United States v.
Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1112 (9th Cir. 2006), Clark still relied primarily on the U.S. Supreme Court's
reasoning in Lopez and Morrison in deciding whether Congress acted within its Foreign Commerce
Clause power. See id. at 1115. Accordingly, Lopez and Morrison will remain the focus of this
Comment.
31. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3; see Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556.
32. Clark, 435 F.3dat 1113.
33. The U.S. Supreme Court has undertaken limited discussion of Congress's Foreign Commerce
Clause authority in cases involving states attempting to regulate the instrumentalities of foreign
commerce. E.g., Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 444-54 (1979). In Japan
Line, the Court outlined the "negative implications" of Congress's Foreign Commerce Clause power
by holding that a state property tax on cargo containers used exclusively in foreign commerce was
unconstitutional. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Court stated that "[f]oreign commerce is
preeminently a matter of national concern," and cited an earlier decision in which the Court
recognized "the Framers' overriding concern that 'the Federal Government must speak with one
voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments."' Id. at 448-49 (quoting
Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976)).
34. Id. at 448 ("Although the Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, grants Congress power to regulate
commerce 'with foreign Nations' and 'among the several States' in parallel phrases, there is
evidence that the Founders intended the scope of the foreign commerce power to be the greater.").
35. See supra note 33 (describing the U.S. Supreme Court's limited analysis of the Foreign
Commerce Clause).
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B. United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison Demonstrate
that Congress's Commerce Clause Authority is Limited
Although Congress has great latitude in enacting legislation under its
Commerce Clause authority,36 the concept of enumerated powers-the
notion that every law Congress enacts must stem from its enumerated
authority in the Constitution37-requires that Congress's Commerce
Clause authority not exceed certain outer limits. 38 Most of the Court's
decisions on the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause authority
concern Congress's regulation of commerce "among the several
States. ' 39 In these decisions, the Court has recognized Congress's broad
power under the Commerce Clause to regulate interstate commerce.4 °
Indeed, the Court requires a "plain showing" that Congress has exceeded
its Commerce Clause authority before it will invalidate a statute.41
Nonetheless, in addressing Interstate Commerce Clause challenges, the
Court has reiterated the axiom that our federal government is one of
enumerated powers, 42 and, as such, there are limits as to how far
Congress's Commerce Clause authority extends.43
Congress lacks authority under the Interstate Commerce Clause to
enact a statute unless the statute either: (1) regulates the use of the
channels of interstate commerce; 44 (2) regulates and protects the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in
interstate commerce;45 or (3) regulates activity that substantially affects
46 1iinterstate commerce. For example, in Lopez, the Court held that the
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 (GFSZA),47 which made it a federal
36. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608 (2000).
37. E.g., id. at 607 ("Every law enacted by Congress must be based on one or more of its powers
enumerated in the Constitution."); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) ("The
Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers.").
38. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557).
39. United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1111 (9th Cir. 2006).
40. See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608.
41. E.g., id. at 607.
42. See, e.g., id. ("Every law enacted by Congress must be based on one or more of its powers
enumerated in the Constitution."); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552 ("The Constitution creates a Federal
Government of enumerated powers.").
43. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557).
44. See, e.g., id. at 607.
45. See, e.g., id.
46. See, e.g., id.
47. Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1702, 104 Stat. 4844, invalidated by Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552.
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offense for an individual knowingly to possess a firearm in a school
zone, 48 was an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's Commerce
Clause authority.49 The Court reached a similar conclusion in Morrison,
holding that section 40302 of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994
(VAWA), 50 which allowed victims of gender-motivated violent crimes
to recover from the perpetrators of those crimes, 51 exceeded Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause.52 The Court in Lopez explained that
upholding the statute would require converting the Commerce Clause to
a general police power.53 The Court was unwilling to adopt such an
expansive interpretation partly because it "would require [the Court] to
conclude that the Constitution's enumeration of powers does not
presuppose something not enumerated.,
54
1. Where Congress Seeks to Regulate Criminal Conduct Occurring
Outside the Channels of Interstate Commerce, It Fails to Satisfy the
Channels Prong of Interstate Commerce Clause Analysis
In Lopez, the GFSZA did not satisfy the channels prong of the
Interstate Commerce Clause framework because it regulated criminal
conduct occurring outside the channels of interstate commerce.55
Instead, the GFSZA made it a federal offense for an individual
knowingly to possess a firearm in a school zone.56 The Court explained
that the GFSZA did not prohibit the movement of firearms in the
channels of interstate commerce or otherwise regulate the use of the
channels of interstate commerce.57
In Morrison, the Court similarly concluded that VAWA did not fall
within the channels prong.58 The Court reasoned that VAWA prohibited
gender-motivated violence regardless of whether the violence involved
48. See id. at 4844.
49. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552.
50. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902, 1941-42, invalidated by Morrison, 529 U.S. at 602.
51. See id.
52. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 602.
53. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
54. Id.
55. See id. at 559.
56. Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1702, 104 Stat. 4844, 4844,
invalidated by Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552.
57. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 569.
58. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609.
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the use of the channels of interstate commerce.5 9 Absent any tangible
link to the channels of interstate commerce, VAWA could not be
interpreted as regulating the use of the channels of interstate
commerce.
60
2. Where Congress Seeks to Regulate Criminal Conduct Occurring
Outside the Channels of Interstate Commerce, It Is Not Protecting
the Instrumentalities of or Persons or Things in, Interstate
Commerce
Lopez and Morrison also summarily concluded that the
instrumentalities prong of the Interstate Commerce Clause framework
did not apply because, again, the statutes regulated criminal conduct
occurring outside the channels of interstate commerce. 6 In both
decisions, the conclusion seemed self-evident.62 Lopez held that the
instrumentalities prong was inapplicable because the GFSZA did not
protect an instrumentality or thing in interstate commerce.63 Morrison
also concluded that the instrumentalities prong did not apply because
VAWA was concerned with gender-motivated violence wherever it
occurred and was not directed at the instrumentalities of, or persons or
things in, interstate commerce.64
3. Absent a Statutory Economic Component, Statutes that Regulate
Criminal Conduct Occurring Outside the Channels of Interstate
Commerce Are Not Justified Under the Substantially Affects Prong
In Lopez and Morrison, the Court focused its analysis on whether the
challenged statute satisfied the third prong of the Interstate Commerce
Clause framework, namely Congress's power to regulate activity that
substantially affects interstate commerce.65 The substantially affects
prong is typically used to justify the regulation of intrastate commercial
activity that nevertheless has a substantial effect on interstate
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See id.; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.
62. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.
63. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.
64. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609.
65. See id. at 609-19; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-68.
Vol. 81:621, 2006
Foreign Commerce Clause Limitations
commerce. 66 Only statutes that contain an economic component have
been upheld under the substantially affects prong.67
In Lopez, the absence of any economic component in the GFSZA was
essential to the Court's holding that the GFSZA failed to satisfy the
substantially affects prong.68 The GFSZA was a criminal statute that
bore no direct relation to commerce, an economic enterprise, or any
larger regulation of economic activity. 69 In prior decisions, the Court had
only upheld statutes under the substantially affects prong where the
regulated activity arose out of, or was connected with, a commercial
transaction that in the aggregate substantially affects interstate
commerce. 70 In light of the fact that the criminal activity regulated by the
GFSZA did not, as a whole, substantially affect interstate commerce, the
Court concluded that the GFSZA exceeded Congress's power under the
substantially affects prong.
71
In Morrison, the Court held that VAWA did not satisfy the
substantially affects prong of the framework after finding that it did not
contain an economic component.72 The Court explained that the
economic nature of the regulated activity plays a central role in
determining whether a statute satisfies the substantially affects prong;
73
indeed, only statutes that contain an economic component have been
upheld under the substantially affects prong.74 Because VAWA
regulated gender-motivated, violent crimes that were entirely unrelated
to economic activity, the Court concluded that VAWA failed to satisfy
the substantially affects prong.75
In both Lopez and Morrison, the Court recognized that a statutory
economic component prevents unlimited exercise of Congress's
Commerce Clause authority under the substantially affects prong.76 In
66. See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-61.
67. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-61.
68. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561, 563-68; see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610 (stating "a fair
reading of Lopez shows that the noneconomic, criminal nature of the conduct at issue was central to
our decision in that case").
69. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 561-68.
72. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610-19.
73. Seeid. at610.
74. See id. at 613.
75. See id. at 613-19.
76. See id. at 610-19; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-68.
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Lopez, for example, the Court found the GFSZA's link between gun
possession. and commerce too attenuated.77 The Court rejected the
argument that gun possession in a school zone may result in violent
crime, and that violent crime, in turn, saddles the national economy with
substantial costs and inhibits national productivity because individuals
are unwilling to travel to unsafe areas.78 The Court explained that this
kind of reasoning would enable Congress to regulate nearly anything.79
Although the Court's concern was directed primarily at the potential
obliteration of the Constitution's distinction between national and local
authority, 80 the Court stressed the importance of adhering to the axiom
that the Constitution creates a federal government of enumerated
powers. 81 The Constitution deliberately withholds from Congress
82plenary police power to enact every type of legislation.
In sum, the Court has acknowledged that Congress has broad power
under the Commerce Clause and that Congress's Foreign Commerce
Clause power is greater than its Interstate Commerce Clause power.
Nevertheless, the Court has also recognized that Congress's Commerce
Clause authority is limited because our Constitution creates a federal
government of enumerated powers. In Lopez and Morrison, the Court
adhered to this notion of enumerated authority by invalidating statutes
enacted under the Interstate Commerce Clause that did not contain an
economic component.
77. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-68; see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612 (stating "our decision in
Lopez rested in part on the fact that the link between gun possession and a substantial effect on
interstate commerce was attenuated").
78. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-64.
79. See id. at 564; see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-19 (rejecting the same reasoning advanced
by the Government in Lopez because it would enable Congress to regulate nearly anything).
80. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68.
81. See id. ("Admittedly, some of our prior cases have taken long steps down that road, giving
great deference to congressional action. The broad language in these opinions has suggested the
possibility of additional expansion, but we decline here to proceed any further. To do so would
require us to conclude that the Constitution's enumeration of powers does not presuppose something
not enumerated, and that there never will be a distinction between what is truly national and what is
truly local. This we are unwilling to do.") (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
82. See id. at 566; see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618 n.8 ("With its careful enumeration of
federal powers and explicit statement that all powers not granted to the Federal Government are
reserved, the Constitution cannot realistically be interpreted as granting the Federal Government an
unlimited license to regulate.").
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III. COURTS HAVE APPLIED INTERSTATE COMMERCE
CLAUSE ANALYSIS IN FOREIGN COMMERCE CASES
In two decisions, United States v. Cummings83 and United States v.
Bredimus,84 U.S. Courts of Appeals employed the U.S. Supreme Court's
Interstate Commerce Clause analysis in evaluating whether statutes
exceeded Congress's authority under the Foreign Commerce Clause.
85
Cummings and Bredimus held that the challenged statutes withstood
Foreign Commerce Clause scrutiny because they satisfied the channels
prong of the Interstate Commerce Clause framework-they regulated a
wrongful use of the channels of foreign commerce.86 By employing the
Interstate Commerce Clause framework, Cummings and Bredimus
suggest that the constitutional concerns informing the U.S. Supreme
Court's analysis under the Interstate Commerce framework also impose
limitations on Congress's Foreign Commerce Clause authority.
87
The first decision to employ the U.S. Supreme Court's Interstate
Commerce Clause framework in the context of foreign commerce was
Cummings.88  In Cummings, the Ninth Circuit examined the
constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 1204(a),89  which criminalizes the
retention of a kidnapped child in a foreign country. 90 The Government
charged Cole Cameron Cummings under § 1204(a) for taking two of his
children to Germany and retaining them there in violation of the parental
rights of the children's mother.91
The Cummings court rejected the Foreign Commerce Clause
challenge against § 1204(a) because the statute removed an impediment
83. 281 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2002).
84. 352 F.3d 200 (5th Cir. 2003).
85. See Bredimus, 352 F.3d at 205; Cummings, 281 F.3d at 1049.
86. See Bredimus, 352 F.3d at 205-08; Cummings, 281 F.3d at 1050.
87. See Bredimus, 352 F.3d at 204-08; Cummings, 281 F.3d at 1048-51.
88. See Cummings, 281 F.3d at 1049.
89. See id. at 1048.
90. See 18 U.S.C. § 1204(a) (2000) ("Whoever removes a child from the United States or retains
a child (who has been in the United States) outside the United States with intent to obstruct the
lawful exercise of parental rights shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 3 years,
or both."). Since Cummings, § 1204(a) has been amended to include a prohibition against persons
who "attempt to" remove a child from the United States. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1204(a) (West 2000 &
Supp. 2006) ("Whoever removes a child from the United States, or attempts to do so, or retains a
child (who has been in the United States) outside the United States with intent to obstruct the lawful
exercise of parental rights shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 3 years, or
both.") (emphasis added).
91. See Cummings, 281 F.3d at 1048.
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to a child's unobstructed use of the channels of foreign commerce. 92 The
Cummings court reasoned that if a child is wrongfully retained in a
foreign country, the child cannot freely use the channels of foreign
commerce to return to America. 93 Section 1204(a) prohibits this
wrongful retention and thereby eliminates an impediment on the use of
the channels of foreign commerce. 94 The court's analysis implies that the
constitutional concerns informing the U.S. Supreme Court's analysis
under the Interstate Commerce Clause framework also impose
limitations on Congress's Foreign Commerce Clause power.
95
The second court of appeals decision to employ the U.S. Supreme
Court's Interstate Commerce Clause framework in the foreign commerce
arena was Bredimus, a decision that resembles Cummings in many
respects.96 In Bredimus, the Fifth Circuit analyzed 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b), 97
which prohibited U.S. citizens and permanent residents from traveling in
foreign commerce for the purpose of engaging in sexual activity with a
person under eighteen years of age. 98 Nicholas Bredimus was charged
under § 2423(b) for traveling to Thailand with the intention of making
videotapes and digital images of Thai children engaged in sexually
explicit conduct. 99 He pleaded guilty and later challenged the validity of
92. See id. at 1050.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 1048-51.
96. See United States v. Bredimus, 352 F.3d 200, 205-08 (5th Cir. 2003).
97. See id. at 202-08. Bredimus construed former subsection (b), which is substantively the same
as the current version. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) (2000) ("TRAVEL WITH INTENT To ENGAGE IN
SEXUAL ACT WITH A JUVENILE.-A person who travels in interstate commerce, or conspires to do
so, or a United States citizen or an alien admitted for permanent residence in the United States who
travels in foreign commerce, or conspires to do so, for the purpose of engaging in any sexual act (as
defined in section 2246) with a person under 18 years of age that would be in violation of chapter
109A if the sexual act occurred in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United
States shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both.") with 18 U.S.C.
§ 2423(b) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006) ("Travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct.-A
person who travels in interstate commerce or travels into the United States, or a United States
citizen or an alien admitted for permanent residence in the United States who travels in foreign
commerce, for the purpose of engaging in any illicit sexual conduct with another person shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.").
98. See 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) (2000) (stating "a United States citizen or an alien admitted for
permanent residence in the United States who travels in foreign commerce, or conspires to do so,
for the purpose of engaging in any sexual act (as defined in section 2246) with a person under 18
years of age that would be in violation of chapter 109A if the sexual act occurred in the special
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States shall be fined under this title, imprisoned
not more than 15 years, or both") (emphasis added).
99. See Bredimus, 352 F.3d at 202.
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his guilty plea by arguing that § 2423(b) was unconstitutional under the
Foreign Commerce Clause.
100
The Bredimus court rejected the defendant's guilty plea challenge
after finding that § 2423(b) regulated the channels of foreign
commerce. 01 In analyzing § 2423(b), the court relied on several
decisions upholding statutes that criminalized the actions of persons who
use the channels of commerce with the intent to engage in wrongful
activity. 102 Primarily, the court relied on a Second Circuit decision
upholding the part of § 2423(b) that criminalized travel in interstate
commerce for the purpose of engaging in sexual activity with a minor.
10 3
The court found no reason to disagree with this analogous, interstate
commerce precedent, and, accordingly, concluded that § 2423(b)
withstood constitutional scrutiny.
10 4
In analyzing the case in this manner, the court in Bredimus-like the
court in Cummings-implied that the constitutional concerns informing
the U.S. Supreme Court's analysis under the Interstate Commerce
Clause framework also limit Congress's power under the Foreign
Commerce Clause.'0 5 This implication can be drawn even though both
courts acknowledge that Congress's power under the Foreign Commerce
Clause is broader than its power under the Interstate Commerce
Clause. 0 6 However, neither Cummings nor Bredimus actually
invalidated a statute on the basis of the U.S. Supreme Court's
constitutional concerns in the interstate context. 1 7 Thus, neither decision
provides a clear picture of the contours of Congress's Foreign
Commerce Clause power.
In sum, Cummings and Bredimus employed the U.S. Supreme Court's
Interstate Commerce Clause framework when analyzing challenges to
congressional power under the Foreign Commerce Clause. Cummings
and Bredimus held that the challenged statutes withstood Foreign
Commerce Clause scrutiny because they regulated a wrongful use of the
100. See id. at 201.
101. See id. at 205-08.
102. See id. at 205-07.
103. See id. at 205-06 (citing United States v. Han, 230 F.3d 560, 565 (2d Cir. 2000)).
104. See id. at 207-08.
105. See id. at 204-08.
106. See id. at 208 (citing Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979));
United States v. Cummings, 281 F.3d 1046, 1049 n.1 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Japan Line, 441 U.S. at
448).
107. See Bredimus, 352 F.3d at 205-08; Cummings, 281 F.3d at 1050.
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channels of foreign commerce. Although Cummings and Bredimus
acknowledge that Congress's power under the Foreign Commerce
Clause is greater than its power under the Interstate Commerce Clause,
their use of the framework implies that the constitutional concerns
informing the U.S. Supreme Court's analysis under the Interstate
Commerce Clause framework also impose limitations on Congress's
Foreign Commerce Clause authority.
IV. ONE CIRCUIT COURT REQUIRES A "CONSTITUTIONALLY
TENABLE NEXUS" WITH FOREIGN COMMERCE
A competing approach to analyzing Foreign Commerce Clause
challenges-created by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in
United States v. Clark' 8-attempts to distance itself from the U.S.
Supreme Court's Interstate Commerce Clause analysis.10 9 Under the
Clark approach, Congress may enact laws under its Foreign Commerce
Clause power if those laws have a constitutionally tenable nexus with
foreign commerce.10° To establish this nexus with foreign commerce, a
statute must contain an economic component.11'
In June 2003, Cambodian authorities arrested a seventy-one-year-old
U.S. citizen named Michael Lewis Clark in Phnom Penh, Cambodia and
charged him with debauchery for having sex with two underage boys."
12
With the Cambodian government's permission, the U.S. government
began an investigation.' 13 Clark ultimately confessed and returned to the
United States to face indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) and (e), 114
which criminalizes the overseas illicit sexual conduct (or attempted
conduct) of U.S. citizens and permanent residents." 5 Clark pleaded
guilty to two counts under § 2423(c) and (e), but reserved his right to
challenge the constitutionality of the statute.116 On appeal, Clark
108. 435 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 2006).
109. See id. at 1103.
110. See id. at 1114.
Ill. Seeid. at lll4-17.
112. See id. at 1103.
113. See id. at 1103-04.
114. See id. at 1104.
115. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2423(c) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006); id. § 2423(e) ("Attempt and
conspiracy.-Whoever attempts or conspires to violate subsection (a), (b), (c), or (d) shall be
punishable in the same manner as a completed violation of that subsection.").
116. See Clark, 435 F.3dat 1104.
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contended that Congress had exceeded its authority under the Foreign
Commerce Clause in enacting § 2423(c).1 17
The court initially declined to follow the Interstate Commerce Clause
framework.1 18 It drew a sharp distinction between Congress's Foreign
Commerce Clause power and its Interstate Commerce Clause power by
noting that the Founders intended the scope of the Foreign Commerce
Clause power to be greater.119 In the court's view, adapting the Interstate
Commerce Clause framework to the context of foreign commerce-the
approach taken by Cummings and Bredimus-is sometimes
inappropriate. 120 The court explained that the Interstate Commerce
Clause framework was developed in light of federalism and state
sovereignty concerns that are absent in foreign affairs.
121
Consequently, instead of employing the U.S. Supreme Court's
Interstate Commerce Clause framework, the Clark court decided to take
a "global, commonsense approach to the circumstances presented [by the
case]. 122 This commonsense approach entailed "look[ing] to the text of
§ 2423(c) [and (f)(2)] to discern whether it has a constitutionally tenable
nexus with foreign commerce."'' 23 Following this pronouncement, the
Clark court restated in seemingly broader terms that the inquiry involves
determining "whether the statute bears a rational relationship to
Congress's authority under the Foreign Commerce Clause. 124
117. See id.
118. See id. at 1103. Judges McKeown and Hug formed a majority in this three-judge panel
decision. See id. at 1102. Judge Ferguson filed a dissenting opinion rejecting the majority opinion's
Foreign Commerce Clause analysis. See id. at 1117-21 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
119. See id. at 1103 (quoting Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448
(1979)).
120. See id. at 1116.
121. Seeid. at 1103, 1113-14.
122. Id. at 1103.
123. Id. at 1114.
124. See id. at 1114. Again, in spite of its earlier dismissal of the Interstate Commerce Clause
framework, the Clark court appears to employ aspects of the framework's third prong. See id.
("Taking a page from Raich, we review the statute under the traditional rational basis standard."
(citing Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2211 (2005)); see also id. at 1118 n.1
(Ferguson, J., dissenting) ("Courts apply rationality review to assess whether Congress had a
'rational basis' for concluding that a particular activity 'substantially affects' interstate commerce,
not to inquire generally 'whether the statute bears a rational relationship to Congress's authority
under the [] Commerce Clause."') (citations omitted)); cf Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2208 ("We need not
determine whether respondents' activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate
commerce in fact, but only whether a 'rational basis' exists for so concluding.") (quoting United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995)).
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Applying this global approach, the Clark court concluded that
§ 2423(f)(2) satisfied the rational nexus requirement.125 The court
analyzed the two elements required under § 2423(f)(2) independently to
illustrate why the statute fairly relates to foreign commerce. 26 First, to
trigger the statute, a person must travel in foreign commerce.
12 7
According to the court, this element clearly establishes that Congress
invoked the Foreign Commerce Clause.12 8 To satisfy the second element,
a person must then engage in a commercial sex act with a person under
eighteen years of age. 129 Because the U.S. Supreme Court has long
recognized that the Commerce Clause covers all commercial activity
between the United States and foreign nations, the Clark court
concluded that the Foreign Commerce Clause covers the second element
of § 2423(f)(2)-the commercial activity of sex with minors overseas in
exchange for money.
130
Despite its earlier dismissal of the Interstate Commerce Clause
framework, 13' the Clark court conceded that the framework may provide
guidance in analyzing cases under the Foreign Commerce Clause.
32
Significantly, the court devoted part of its analysis to distinguishing
§ 2423(f)(2) from the U.S. Supreme Court's concerns in Lopez and
Morrison.13 3 The Clark court reiterated the U.S. Supreme Court's
concern with Congress using the Commerce Clause to enact criminal
statutes that are entirely unrelated to commercial activity or economic
enterprise. 34 According to the court, § 2423(f)(2), despite its criminal
nature, 3 5 avoids these concerns because the second element of the
125. See Clark, 435 F.3d at 1114-17.
126. See id. at 1114-15.
127. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2423(c) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006); Clark, 435 F.3d at 1114.
128. See Clark, 435 F.3d at 1114.
129. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2423(c), (f); Clark, 435 F.3d at 1114-15.
130. See Clark, 435 F.3d at 1113-15.
131. See id. at 1103.
132. See id. at 1116.
133. See id. at 1115.
134. See id. (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000)).
135. The court cited several decisions involving statutes enacted under Congress's Foreign
Commerce Clause power that regulate crimes with an economic facet. See id. at 1115-16 (citing
United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 741 (5th Cir. 2004) (Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977,
Pub. L. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494); United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 195-96 (3d Cir. 1998)
(Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub L. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488); and United States v. Gertz,
249 F.2d 662, 666-67 (9th Cir. 1957) (statute criminalizing the forging or counterfeiting of foreign
currency)).
Vol. 81:621, 2006
Foreign Commerce Clause Limitations
statute regulates activity that is "quintessentially economic"' 36-- again,
sex with minors overseas in exchange for money.
137
The key role that the second element of § 2423(f)(2) played in both
demonstrating how the statute fairly relates to foreign commerce and
distinguishing Lopez and Morrison implies that a statutory economic
component is required to establish a constitutionally tenable nexus with
foreign commerce. 138 The court strongly implied that both elements of
§ 2423(f)(2) were necessary to satisfy the constitutionally tenable nexus
approach. 139 Although the travels in foreign commerce element invoked
the Foreign Commerce Clause, the court never considered whether the
first element was sufficient on its own to uphold the statute.140 The
court's analysis suggests that the economic component inherent in the
commercial sex with minors overseas element of § 2423(f)(2) was
critical to the court's outcome. 14 1 The court used the economic
component both to demonstrate how § 2423(f)(2) fairly relates to foreign
commerce and to distinguish § 2423(0(2) from the invalidated statutes
in Lopez and Morrison that did not include an economic component.
42
Notably, the economic requirement implicit in the Clark court's
constitutionally tenable nexus approach appears to be identical to the
implicit economic requirement of the Interstate Commerce Clause
framework's substantially affects prong. 143 Thus, satisfaction of the
constitutionally tenable nexus requirement would appear to imply
satisfaction of the substantially affects prong.
136. Id. at 1115 (quoting Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 125 S. Ct. 2205, 2211 (2005)).
137. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2423(c), (f).
138. See id. at 1114-17.
139. See id. at 1103 ("Where, as in this appeal, the defendant travels in foreign commerce to a
foreign country and offers to pay a child to engage in sex acts, his conduct falls under the broad
umbrella of foreign commerce and consequently within congressional authority under the Foreign
Commerce Clause."); id. at 1114 ("We hold that § 2423(c)'s combination of requiring travel in
foreign commerce, coupled with engagement in a commercial transaction while abroad, implicates
foreign commerce to a constitutionally adequate degree."); id. at 1116 ("The combination of Clark's
travel in foreign commerce and his conduct of an illicit commercial sex act in Cambodia shortly
thereafter puts the statute squarely within Congress's Foreign Commerce Clause authority."); id. at
1117 ("The fact that §[ ] 2423(c) and ()(2) meld[s] these economic and criminal components into a
single statue does not put the conduct beyond Congress's reach under the Foreign Commerce
Clause.").
140. See id. at 1114-17.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id.
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In sum, the Clark court requires that the text of a statute demonstrate
a constitutionally tenable nexus with foreign commerce in order to
survive Foreign Commerce Clause scrutiny. The Clark court found that§ 2423(f)(2) establishes this nexus because the statute regulates
commercial activity, which both fairly relates to foreign commerce and
is distinguishable from the invalidated statutes in Lopez and Morrison
that did not include an economic component. By requiring an economic
component, the constitutionally tenable nexus analysis appears to adopt
the implicit economic requirement of the Interstate Commerce Clause
framework's substantially affects prong.
V. SECTION 2423(F)(1) FAILS TO WITHSTAND FOREIGN
COMMERCE CLAUSE SCRUTINY
Under the Foreign Commerce Clause analyses laid out by the U.S.
Courts of Appeals, 144 Congress exceeded its Foreign Commerce Clause
authority when it enacted § 2423(f)(1). Although the U.S. Supreme
Court has recognized that Congress has broad power under the Foreign
Commerce Clause, 145 the Court's Interstate Commerce Clause decisions
adhere to the axiom that the Constitution creates a federal government of
enumerated powers. Congress's enumerated Commerce Clause authority
is thus constitutionally limited.1 46 To that end, U.S. Courts of Appeals
have employed two analyses to determine the constitutionality of a
statute under the Foreign Commerce Clause. 147 Section 2423(0(1) fails
to withstand Foreign Commerce Clause scrutiny under the channels or
instrumentalities prongs of the Interstate Commerce Clause framework
employed by Cummings and Bredimus 48 because the statute regulates
criminal conduct occurring outside the channels of foreign commerce.149
It likewise fails the analysis advanced by Clark because the statute does
not include the economic component necessary to establish a
constitutionally tenable nexus with foreign commerce. 150 Accordingly,
144. See id. at 1109-17; United States v. Bredimus, 352 F.3d 200, 204-08 (5th Cir. 2003); United
States v. Cummings, 281 F.3d 1046, 1048-51 (9th Cir. 2002).
145. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608 (2000).
146. See id. at 607-08.
147. See Clark 435 F.3d at 1109-17; Bredimus, 352 F.3d at 204-08; Cummings, 281 F.3d at
1048-51.
148. See Bredimus, 352 F.3d at 205; Cummings, 281 F.3d at 1049.
149. Cf Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.
150. See Clark, 435 F.3d at 1114-17.
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§ 2423(0(1) does not satisfy the substantially affects prong of the
framework employed by Cummings and Bredimus because of the
absence of a statutory economic component.
151
A. Section 242369(J) Does Not Satisfy the Interstate Commerce
Clause Framework
Cummings and Bredimus held that the challenged statutes withstood
Foreign Commerce Clause scrutiny because they regulated a wrongful
use of the channels of foreign commerce. 152 In reaching these holdings,
the Fifth and Ninth Circuits deliberately employed the U.S. Supreme
Court's Interstate Commerce Clause framework.1 53 This suggests that
the constitutional concerns driving the U.S. Supreme Court to recognize
limitations on Congress's Interstate Commerce Clause power also
impose limitations on Congress's Foreign Commerce Clause power.
154
Accordingly, decisions where the U.S. Supreme Court has invalidated a
statute under the Interstate Commerce Clause framework-like Lopez
and Morrison155-shed light on the circumstances under which a court
might invalidate congressional acts under the Foreign Commerce
Clause. In Lopez and Morrison, the Court found that congressional
attempts to regulate criminal activity occurring outside the channels of
commerce did not satisfy the channels or instrumentalities prongs of the
Interstate Commerce Clause framework.
56
Section 2423(0(1) does not satisfy the channels or instrumentalities
prongs of the framework employed by Cummings and Bredimus because
it regulates criminal conduct occurring outside the channels of foreign
commerce.157 Although § 2423(0(1) contains an element requiring travel
in foreign commerce, this provision's criminalization of noncommercial
sexual abuse of minors overseas is not obviously related to the channels
of foreign commerce. 58 The statute upheld in Bredimus, § 2423(b),
151. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-61.
152. See Bredimus, 352 F.3d at 205-08; Cummings, 281 F.3d at 1050.
153. See Bredimus, 352 F.3d at 205; Cummings, 281 F.3d at 1049.
154. See Bredimus, 352 F.3d at 204-08; Cummings, 281 F.3d at 1048-51.
155. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 601-19; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551-68.
156. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.
157. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2423(c), (f) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609;
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.
158. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2423(c), (f).
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illustrates this distinction.15 9 It requires that a person travel in foreign
commerce with the criminal intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct.
160
Section 2423(f)(1), in contrast, covers persons who travel in foreign
commerce with no criminal intent whatsoever.1 61 If a person sexually
abuses a minor abroad-even years after traveling in foreign
commerce-the person violates § 2423(f)(1). 162 Section 2423(f)(1) is
thus similar to the statutes that failed to satisfy the channels and
instrumentalities prongs of the framework in Lopez and Morrison
because it criminalizes noncommercial sexual abuse of minors overseas
regardless of whether the abuse takes place in the channels of
commerce. 163 In other words, Congress did not seek to restrict
§ 2423(f)(1)'s coverage to sexual abuse occurring in the channels of
commerce.' 64 Accordingly, § 2423(f)(1) fails to satisfy the channels or
instrumentalities prongs of the framework because the noncommercial
sexual abuse of minors overseas occurs outside the channels of foreign
commerce. 165
The substantially affects prong of the Interstate Commerce Clause
framework is subsumed under the Clark court's constitutionally tenable
nexus approach.166 Although Cummings and Bredimus give no guidance
in determining whether a statute satisfies the substantially affects prong
of the framework, 167 Clark, in creating the constitutionally tenable nexus
approach, appears to adopt the substantially affects prong's implicit
economic requirement. 168 Thus, if § 2423(f)(1) fails to satisfy Clark's
constitutionally tenable nexus analysis, § 2423(f)(1) necessarily fails to
satisfy the substantially affects prong of the framework employed by
Cummings and Bredimus.t 69 Stated another way, § 2423(f)(1) does not
159. See 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) (2000); Bredimus, 352 F.3d at 205-08.
160. See 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b).
161. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2423(c), (f) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006).
162. See id.; United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1119-20 (9th Cir. 2006) (Ferguson, J.,
dissenting).
163. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2423(c), (f); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609 (2000); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995).
164. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2423(c), ().
165. See id.; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.
166. See Clark, 435 F.3d at 1114-17.
167. See United States v. Bredimus, 352 F.3d 200, 204-08 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v.
Cummings, 281 F.3d 1046, 1048-51 (9th Cir. 2002).
168. See Clark, 435 F.3d at 1114-17.
169. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-61; supra Part IV (describing the
constitutionally tenable nexus analysis).
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satisfy the substantially affects prong of the framework if the statute fails
the constitutionally tenable nexus analysis. 70 As explained in the
following section, § 2423(f)(1) does not demonstrate a constitutionally
tenable nexus with foreign commerce. 171 Thus, § 2423(f)(1) also fails to
satisfy the substantially affects prong of the framework employed by
Cummings and Bredimus.'
72
B. Section 2423()9 (1) Does Not Demonstrate a Constitutionally
Tenable Nexus with Foreign Commerce
Under Clark, the text of § 2423(f)(1) must demonstrate a
constitutionally tenable nexus with foreign commerce. 17 3 The Clark
court held that § 2423(f)(2) established this nexus because that statute
regulates commercial activity, which both fairly relates to foreign
commerce and is distinguishable from the statutes invalidated in Lopez
and Morrison.174 Accordingly, to establish a constitutionally tenable
nexus with foreign commerce, a statute must include an economic
component. 175 Absent this statutory economic requirement, Congress
would have plenary power to regulate nearly any criminal activity under
its Foreign Commerce Clause power. 176 Although Congress has broad
power over foreign affairs, 177 plenary power in this arena would
contravene the axiom-reiterated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Lopez
and Morrison178 -that the Constitution creates a federal government of
enumerated powers. 179 The constitutionally tenable nexus approach
recognizes this notion of enumerated authority and thus imposes
170. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-61; supra Part IV (describing the
constitutionally tenable nexus analysis).
171. See infra Part V.B (analyzing § 2423(0(1) under the constitutionally tenable nexus analysis).
172. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-61; supra Part IV (describing the
constitutionally tenable nexus analysis).
173. See Clark, 435 F.3d at 1114-17.
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-19.
177. See, e.g., Clark, 435 F.3d at 1109 n.14 (explaining that the focus of the court's review is on
the constitutionality of § 2423(c) under the Commerce Clause, but acknowledging that Congress's
implied foreign affairs power may provide an adequate basis for enacting § 2423(c)).
178. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607; United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995).
179. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618 n.8; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68.
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constitutional limitations on Congress's power under the Foreign
Commerce Clause.'
80
The text of § 2423(f)(1) fails to demonstrate a constitutionally tenable
nexus with foreign commerce under Clark because the statute regulates
activity that does not include an economic component.1 81 Section
2423(f)(1) criminalizes the sexual abuse of minors regardless of whether
the abuse takes place in a commercial context. 82 By failing to include a
statutory economic component, § 2423(f)(1) exemplifies the strong
concerns that the U.S. Supreme Court articulated in Lopez and
Morrison's substantially affects prong analysis, 83 and that the Clark
court reiterated in its constitutionally tenable nexus analysis-
"Congress's use of the Commerce Clause to enact 'a criminal statute that
by its terms has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic
enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms."",1
84
Accordingly, § 2423(f)(1) not only fails to establish a constitutionally
tenable nexus with foreign commerce, 85 but also fails to satisfy the
substantially affects prong of the framework employed in Cummings and
Bredimus.' 
86
In sum, § 2423(f)(1) fails to withstand Foreign Commerce Clause
scrutiny under current U.S. Courts of Appeals analyses. Section
2423(f)(1) does not satisfy the channels or instrumentalities prongs of
the Interstate Commerce Clause framework employed in Cummings and
Bredimus because the statute regulates criminal conduct occurring
outside the channels of foreign commerce. Under Clark, § 2423(f)(1)
does not establish a constitutionally tenable nexus with foreign
commerce because the statute does not contain an economic component.
Absent a statutory economic component, § 2423(f)(1) also fails to satisfy
the substantially affects prong of the framework.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not yet ruled any statutes
criminalizing the conduct of Americans overseas unconstitutional under
180. See Clark, 435 F.3d at 1114-17.
181. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2423(c), (f) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006).
182. See id.
183. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
184. Clark, 435 F.3d at 1115 (quoting Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610).
185. See Clark, 435 F.3d at 1114-17.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 169-172.
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the Foreign Commerce Clause, three U.S. Courts of Appeals decisions
use the concept of enumerated powers, important in U.S. Supreme Court
decisions that invalidate statutes grounded in the Interstate Commerce
Clause, to suggest limitations on Congress's Foreign Commerce Clause
power. In Cummings and Bredimus, the Fifth and Ninth Circuit Courts
of Appeals employed the U.S. Supreme Court's three-pronged Interstate
Commerce Clause framework when analyzing statutes under the Foreign
Commerce Clause. This indicates that the constitutional concerns
driving the U.S. Supreme Court to recognize limitations on Congress's
Interstate Commerce Clause power also impose limitations on
Congress's Foreign Commerce Clause power. In Clark, the Ninth
Circuit incorporated a similar constitutional limitation, holding that
Congress could enact a law under its Foreign Commerce Clause power
only if the statute demonstrated a constitutionally tenable nexus with
foreign commerce by including an economic component.
Section 2423(f)(1) fails to withstand Foreign Commerce Clause
scrutiny under current analyses of the U.S. Courts of Appeals. First, it
does not satisfy the channels or instrumentalities prongs of the
framework because the statute regulates criminal conduct occurring
outside the channels of foreign commerce. Second, the text of
§ 2423(f)(1) does not demonstrate a constitutionally tenable nexus with
foreign commerce because the noncommercial sexual abuse of minors
abroad does not include an economic component. Absent a statutory
economic component, § 2423(f)(1) also fails to satisfy the substantially
affects prong of the framework employed by Cummings and Bredimus.
So long as U.S. Courts of Appeals continue to rely on Interstate
Commerce Clause decisions like Lopez and Morrison in analyzing
challenges to Congress's Foreign Commerce Clause power, statutes
enacted under the Foreign Commerce Clause will remain subject to the
constitutional limitations articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in the
Interstate Commerce Clause context.
644
